For the better part of a decade, Lululemon owned activewear. It built a category, trained a consumer, and made the premium yoga pant a cultural artefact. But foot traffic data tells a new story. Alo Yoga – a brand that operated just 10 locations as recently as early 2023 – has staged one of the most decisive market share grabs in modern specialty retail, scaling to over 100 stores by end of 2024. This report breaks down the data: who’s winning, where, why, and what it means if you’re making decisions about sites, staffing, or spend.
Lululemon lost 9 share points.
Alo captured 7.
Looking at the current snapshot of category foot traffic share, Lululemon still dominates at 77.5% – but that figure represents a loss of 9 share points from the prior period, when it held 86.5%. The traffic that left Lululemon didn’t disappear. Alo Yoga absorbed the majority of it, more than quintupling its share from 1.4% to 8.6%. Vuori held broadly steady, dipping just −0.8 pts to 9.2%.
For real estate teams: The era of Lululemon as the only credible activewear anchor is over. Alo Yoga is now a genuine category draw, and its share trajectory suggests its pull will only grow. Landlords and leasing teams should be treating Alo as a tier-one co-tenancy candidate – not a secondary consideration.
Alo’s same stores grew +7.5%.
Lululemon’s shrank −3.1%.
Market share tells you who’s winning today. Same-store YoY growth tells you the velocity of change – and here the gap between Alo and the field is stark. Across 88 same stores, Alo Yoga grew visits by +7.5% year-on-year. Vuori grew +1.9% across 87 stores. Lululemon, across 395 same stores, declined −3.1%. These are not comparable stores – Alo’s network is younger and smaller – but the directional signal is unambiguous.
Lululemon’s same-store decline is consistent with what the brand has reported publicly. On its Q4 2024 earnings call, CEO Calvin McDonald acknowledged that lower U.S. consumer confidence is weighing on store traffic – with Americas comparable sales flat in the quarter. PassBy’s same-store data shows this isn’t a short-term blip: the underlying visit trend has been negative for the past 12 months. Meanwhile Alo’s +7.5% same-store growth suggests its stores aren’t just opening in new demand pools – they’re deepening performance in existing locations.
For store operations teams: Same-store growth of +7.5% means Alo’s existing locations are getting busier, not just its network growing. This has direct implications for staffing, capacity planning, and in-store experience – stores that were sized and staffed for 2023 volumes may now be under-resourced for 2025 demand.
Alo grows across every format.
Lululemon declines across every format.
Across all three retail formats – enclosed malls, open-air lifestyle centres, and standalone street retail – Alo Yoga posted positive year-on-year traffic growth. Lululemon posted declines in all three. Vuori was positive across all three as well, with standalone street retail its standout at +20.8%.
| Brand | Format | Stores | YoY Traffic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alo Yoga | Enclosed Mall | 44 | ▲ +17.8% |
| Alo Yoga | Open-Air / Lifestyle | 22 | ▲ +13.1% |
| Alo Yoga | Standalone / Street | 21 | ≈ 0.0% |
| Lululemon | Enclosed Mall | 138 | ▼ −3.7% |
| Lululemon | Open-Air / Lifestyle | 154 | ▼ −4.75% |
| Lululemon | Standalone / Street | 99 | ▼ −7.9% |
| Vuori | Enclosed Mall | 30 | ▲ +13.1% |
| Vuori | Open-Air / Lifestyle | 33 | ▲ +1.7% |
| Vuori | Standalone / Street | 24 | ▲ +20.8% |
Alo’s strongest format is enclosed malls at +17.8% YoY. This matters because enclosed malls have been widely written off – yet Alo is growing there faster than anywhere else. Its studio-style “Alo Sanctuary” environments, which feature yoga studios and wellness spaces, appear to convert ambient mall traffic into high-quality visits rather than competing for an already-captive audience. Standalone stores are essentially flat (−0.05%), which suggests the brand’s pull is amplified by mall co-tenancy effects rather than pure destination intent.
Lululemon’s steepest decline is in standalone formats at −7.9%. Standalone stores depend almost entirely on destination intent. The fact that traffic there is falling fastest signals that Lululemon’s status as a brand people actively seek out is eroding – a trend Morningstar noted is likely connected to rising competition in women’s athleisure alongside macro headwinds.
For Alo’s real estate teams: The enclosed mall signal is a green light. Alo’s “Sanctuary” model – built-in yoga studios, organic cafes, wellness programming – is a format that enclosed malls actively need to drive dwell time and repeat visits. This is a genuinely symbiotic relationship, and Alo should be prioritising premium enclosed mall locations in its next expansion phase.
For Lululemon’s real estate and ops teams: A −7.9% standalone decline is a cost structure problem in the making. If destination intent is weakening, standalone stores – which carry full occupancy and operating costs without mall traffic support – face the toughest economics. A portfolio review of standalone locations, and a shift toward formats with ambient footfall, is worth modelling.
Holiday season is bigger for everyone.
But Alo retains the most into January.
The holiday period generates more foot traffic than the New Year resolution window – that’s the norm across activewear. The holiday-to-resolution ratio measures how large that gap is: a ratio of 1.54× means holiday traffic was 54% larger than Jan/Feb visits. A lower ratio means a brand holds its traffic more evenly through the post-holiday period. A higher one means a steeper drop-off after the gifting peak.
Alo has the lowest ratio at 1.54× – its customer base keeps visiting more consistently into the new year relative to its holiday peak. Vuori’s 1.68× is the widest gap, suggesting its traffic is more concentrated around the gifting season.
For marketing teams: Alo’s 1.54× ratio is a quiet competitive advantage – its customers are more habitual, visiting across seasons rather than spiking only at gift moments. For campaign planning, this supports always-on media investment. Vuori’s 1.68× suggests its customer relationship is more transactional around holidays – a vulnerability that a Q1 retention campaign could help address.
Alo and Lululemon get stronger
with more stores. Vuori doesn’t – yet.
Cannibalization is the quiet killer of retail expansion – new stores competing with existing ones for the same visits rather than growing the total demand pool. PassBy measures this by tracking average annual visits per store across three market density stages: exclusive (1 store in a market), developing (2–3 stores), and saturated (4+ stores). A brand with healthy expansion dynamics will see per-store visits hold or recover as density increases. One suffering cannibalization will see them collapse.
Both Alo and Lululemon show anti-cannibalization patterns – visits per store recover strongly in their most saturated markets. For Alo: 69K in exclusive markets, rising to 74K in developing markets, and 100K in saturated ones. With only 2 cities at the saturated tier, the sample is small – but the direction is consistent with a brand still in a demand-building phase where more locations increase awareness and accessibility rather than splitting existing visits.
Lululemon’s recovery is notable given the brand’s maturity and scale. Despite 247 cities at the exclusive stage, its densest markets (200K visits per store across 11 cities) still outperform developing markets (137K). This suggests Lululemon’s brand concentration in well-developed markets continues to generate above-average productivity even as its overall traffic trends decline.
Vuori’s gentle decline – 103K to 85.7K to 83K – is manageable but directionally different from Alo and Lululemon. It hasn’t yet built the brand gravity to see per-store visits compound as it adds locations. With only 3 cities at each of the denser tiers, the sample is limited, but it’s a pattern worth monitoring as expansion accelerates.
For Alo’s real estate teams: Alo is 92 cities deep at single-store density with only 2 cities at 4+ stores – the expansion runway is long, and its most developed markets are its most productive. The data supports an accelerated densification strategy in high-performing existing markets alongside continued new-city entry.
Alo operates in markets that index
29% higher for consumer spend.
These figures don’t measure what shoppers spend at each brand – they measure the broader consumer spending activity within the trade areas surrounding each brand’s stores. It’s a picture of market quality: the economic vitality and category demand in the neighbourhoods each brand has chosen to operate in.
Alo Yoga’s trade areas carry a market basket index of 204, compared to Lululemon’s 158 – a 29% gap. Alo is concentrating its footprint in higher-spending markets. This is consistent with its prestige positioning and “Sanctuary” format: fewer stores, better addresses. Vuori’s markets sit in between at 192. All three are seeing strong YoY spend growth in their surrounding trade areas, with Lululemon’s markets actually growing fastest at +35.2% – though from the lowest base.
| Brand | Markets Analysed | Trade Area Basket Index | Spend / Customer Index | YoY Spend Growth | YoY Txn Growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alo Yoga | 31 | 204 | 204 | +34.1% | +32.5% |
| Vuori | 28 | 192 | 193 | +32.5% | +29.4% |
| Lululemon | 116 | 158 | 158 | +35.2% | +31.4% |
Alo’s 31 analysed markets versus Lululemon’s 116 is itself a strategic signal: Alo is highly selective about where it operates. Its trade areas index at 204 – meaning the markets it has chosen are significantly more affluent and active than the category average. As the brand scales, maintaining that market quality discipline will be critical to preserving its premium positioning. The risk of a Lululemon-style broadening – into markets with lower spend potential – is the one expansion trap Alo should be most deliberate about avoiding.
For real estate teams: The trade area basket index is a useful filter in site selection. Alo’s 204 index reflects a deliberate premium-market strategy. Any new site evaluation should benchmark the trade area spend index against this threshold – locations that fall significantly below it risk diluting the brand’s market positioning and potentially underperforming on category demand.
Six signals.
Three teams. Clear decisions.
Real Estate & Network Planning
Alo is 92 cities deep at single-store density with almost no saturation. Its best-performing markets are its most developed ones – no cannibalization ceiling in sight. Enclosed malls (+17.8% YoY) are its highest-growth format. Treat Alo as a tier-one anchor candidate in premium enclosed environments. For Lululemon, a standalone portfolio review is overdue: −7.9% traffic in a format with full occupancy costs is a structural risk.
Store Operations
Alo’s same-store growth of +7.5% means stores that were planned and staffed for earlier demand levels are now running hotter. Capacity planning, staffing ratios, and in-store experience all need revisiting – particularly in the 9 cities where Alo already operates 2–3 stores. These are the markets where visit volume is compounding fastest.
Marketing & Growth
Alo’s 1.54× holiday ratio – the lowest in the set – signals a habitually engaged customer base. Combined with a trade area basket index of 204 and +34% YoY market spend growth in its trade areas, the demand environment surrounding Alo stores is both premium and growing. Always-on marketing investment, particularly in markets where Alo is at single-store density, can convert that ambient demand into incremental visits ahead of any competitor.
The activewear category has
a new force of gravity.
Alo Yoga’s rise is not a blip. It is evidenced simultaneously across market share (+7.2 pts), same-store traffic (+7.5%), format performance, density dynamics, and trade area quality (market basket index of 204 vs. Lululemon’s 158). The brand scaled from 10 to 100+ stores in under two years – and its existing stores are getting more productive, not less, as the network grows.
The context outside the data reinforces what the data shows. Lululemon’s own management has acknowledged declining U.S. store traffic, flat Americas comparable sales, and a 2025 outlook that came in below analyst expectations. The foot traffic shift PassBy is measuring is not a future risk for Lululemon – it is an ongoing present reality.
For retail real estate, operations, and marketing teams, the implication is the same: Alo deserves treatment as a category leader, not a challenger. The data has already confirmed the shift. Strategy should follow.
Methodology: All data sourced from PassBy Almanac, based on validated real-world foot traffic signals, spend data, and geospatial market intelligence. Market share figures reflect the current period snapshot vs. prior period. YoY and same-store comparisons cover the most recent 12-month period versus the equivalent prior period. Spend data is indexed against category baseline.